By now, there is a large experimental literature showing some kind of status-quo bias.
1 If the subject is given a coffee mug (candy bar) and later given the possibility of trading it for a candy bar (coffee mug) of equal value, the subject is likely to stick with the original allocation (Knetsch, 1989) . Here, we ask whether status-quo bias can be made consistent with downwardsloping demand curves. This paper thus differs in intent from a large body of research that incorporates a different notion of status-quo bias into a more general formulation of revealed preference (e.g., Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005 and Sagi, 2006) ; such research demonstrates that there are different sets of primitives that lead to different axioms of revealed preference. In this paper, we don't care which set of primitives hold or whether such results can be incorporated into the neoclassical model of consumer behavior (as Munro and Sugden, 2003, have done) . 2 Instead, we undertake a strict behavioralist approach: Individuals display status-quo bias and downward-sloping demand curves. Whether such behavior can be derived from a consistent set of assumptions is irrelevant to our purpose. Indeed, we do not require the existence of a preference relation that rationalizes choices at all -all that is required is choice behavior. What we want to find out is the implications of such observed behavior; in particular, we want to determine whether status-quo bias and downward-sloping demand curves are consistent with each other. The short answer is yes, but the consumer will display addictive behavior. 3 The remainder of the paper will be devoted to demonstrating this result.
We will make the following set of assumptions:
A1. There are two goods, x (candy) and y (wine), which are continuously divisible.
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A2. Prices and incomes are exogenously determined. That is, the person has a budget line and budget set.
A3. The individual chooses a point on the budget line.
A4. Strictly downward-sloping demand: if the person chooses x t , y t for a given budget set, b t , and then the person is faced with a different budget set, b t+1 , that goes through x t , y t but where the relative price of x has gone down (up), then x t+1 > x t and y t+1 < y t (x t+1 < x t and y t+1 > y t ).
I. AN INTUITIVE EXAMPLE
Before proceeding with the formal exposition, it is useful to consider the intuition behind the argument. To make the logic as accessible as possible, in the intuitive example, I will assume that individuals have indifference curves and that these indifference curves are homothetic.
Before the subjects come to the experiment, they made choices based on their individual budget sets and preferences. The budget sets of these various individuals have the same slope (the market prices facing the individuals are the same), but the richer individuals have budget sets that are farther out. If individuals have status quo bias, then each individual's choice is based on his/her budget set and his/her unique set of indifference curves, which in turn are based on the reference point established by the individual's experiences and history. While we can use any time period for the analysis, let us suppose here that the time period of analysis is daily so that before and after the experiment, individuals decide each day how much candy and wine to choose. The experimenter divides the subjects into 3 groups. In the first group, the experimenter 4 gives the subjects $10 and then each subject gets to choose either candy or wine (or some combination in between). Knetsch actually did this with candy and coffee cups and found that the subjects split evenly between the two choices. In the second group, the subjects are given $10 worth of candy and then later are allowed to trade in some or all of the candy for the equivalent value of wine. And in the third group, the subjects are given $10 worth of wine and then later are allowed to trade in some or all of the wine for the equivalent value of candy.
Hence, in all three groups, the budget set is shifted upwards for the day, but in Group 1 the status quo reference point remains the same as it was before the experiment (and let us suppose that on average they choose equal amounts of wine and candy), in Group 2 the status quo reference point shifts the indifference curves towards preferring candy so that subjects will tend to keep the candy, while in Group 3, the status quo reference point shifts the indifference curves towards preferring wine so that subjects will tend to keep the wine or more of the wine than subjects in groups 1 and 2. given a choice between keeping the candy or choosing $10 worth of wine, will keep the candy. If the person is given $10 worth of wine, then in the extreme the person's indifference curve will shift to I 3 , and when given a choice between keeping the wine or choosing $10 worth of candy, will keep the wine.
We will consider several generalizations. Looking at the outer pair of axes (now with origin 0, 0) and completely ignoring the inner pair of axes, a person might be allocated 2*, (candy, 0 wine). This results in indifference curve I 2 , which is southeast of indifference curve I 3 , the indifference curve that arises when the person is allocated 3*, (0 candy, wine). In this case, person 2 would trade off some candy for wine and person 3 would trade off some wine for candy, but person 3 would still have more wine and less candy than either person 2 or person 1.
Note that in our analysis, the allocations need not be at the corners, If this status quo bias is not completely ephemeral (that is, it is not just an artifact of the experiment itself), then everyday after the experiment the subjects in Group 3 will continue to buy more wine than the subjects in Group 2 because the experimenter has changed the status quo reference point for these two groups. 5 So this is the essence of status-quo bias -changing the status quo, changes the reference point of the indifference curves in favor of the status quo --the more wine relative to candy in the status quo, the more wine the person will want to consume. Now, if the experimenter can change the status quo, so should other events. Suppose that on Monday instead of going to the experiment, one of the subjects goes shopping and discovers that the price of wine has decreased and the price of candy has increased so that the new budget has rotated through the previous day's purchases. This is illustrated in figure 2 , where b 0 is the original budget set, I 0 is the original set of indifference curves, and b 1 is the new budget set.
Because of the change in relative prices, the subject purchases more wine than otherwise. That is, demand is downward sloping --Monday's purchases (point 1) is to the northwest of Sunday's purchases (point 0). Eventually, call it Tuesday (day is a metaphor and might represent a week or 6 a month), Monday's pattern of consumption will be viewed as the status quo and treated as the reference point for the new set of indifference curves, I
1 . Monday's wine demand was dependent on the status quo (that is Sunday's consumption --0) and the new lower price on Monday. So
Monday's consumption of wine was greater than Sunday's (if nothing changed that weekend).
Tuesday's consumption of wine is dependent on Tuesday's budget set, which is assumed to be the same as Monday's, and on the status quo (Monday's consumption --1). The status quo consumption reference point for Tuesday reflects a greater amount of wine than the status quo consumption reference point for Monday. As was shown in figure 1, when the status quo changes, the indifference curves change in the same direction (in this case, preference for wine)
because of status quo bias. In figure 2 , the new status quo ray is to the left of the old status quo ray, so that the tangency of the new indifference curve to the budget line will be to northwest of the tangency of the old indifference curve to the budget line. The new set of indifference curves are labelled I 1 . Therefore, the person will want to buy more wine than when the set of indifference curves were I 0 even though the budget set no longer changes. In a nutshell, status quo bias argues that the indifference curves will shift in favor of wine (hence the new indifference curves, I 1 ), and a concomitant increase in wine consumption (point 2). The same logic holds for Wednesday versus Tuesday. This process repeats itself: the reference point shifts, creating a new set of indifference curves with a greater bias in favor of wine; then consumption adjusts to reflect the new set of indifference curves, which shifts the status quo point and indifference curves, which shifts consumption toward more wine in response to the new set of indifference curves, etc. When the experimenter gives the subject wine, the subject's status quo reference point shifts in favor of wine; that is, his indifference curves shift in favor of wine. In a similar fashion, when the person consumes more wine (because the price has dropped), 7 eventually (which we label as the next day) the person will view the change in consumption pattern as the new status quo, with an accompanying change in his indifference curves. Because of status quo bias, where more wine (candy) in the status quo means a greater preference for wine (candy), the shift is in favor of more and more wine. The application of status quo bias to ordinary consumption predicts a kind of addiction.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
We will now proceed with a more formal analysis.
II. STATUS QUO CONSUMPTION
The world that we consider is very simple. In the initial period, the experimenter (god)
allocates a certain amount of x and y to the individual (this is the status quo allocation in period 0) and also announces the prices (thus income is also determined). 6 The person must decide how much of each item to consume in that period. For simplicity, we will assume that in period 0 the allocation is in equilibrium; that is, the desired choice by the individual is the allocation provided (god reads the individual's mind and makes an allocation that will be in equilibrium). Without the assumption of equivalence between the allocation by the experimenter and choice by the subject we would immediately have addiction.
In period 1, the budget set rotates around the status-quo allocation point so that the relative price of x decreases; 7 there are no changes in the budget set in any of the following periods. In period t ≥ 1 the status quo is the consumption profile in the previous period, t-1. In this example and in the real world, customary consumption is the obvious candidate for the status quo point. After all in the real world, most of us are paid in money rather than in things so the endowment of goods (except possibly money itself) is not a good candidate for the status quo 8 reference point although such an interpretation is possible. We can thus characterize the sequence in two equivalent ways. (1) In period 0, the experimenter allocates a certain amount of x and y and announces the price ratio (equivalently budget set 0), and in periods 1 through N, the experimenter provides budget set 1; or (2) In period 0, the experimenter allocates a certain amount of x and y and budget set 0, and in periods 1 through N, the experimenter provides the allocation of x and y equivalent to the person's choice of x and y in the previous period and a set of prices so that the budget set remains the same from period 1 on.
Let (x sq , y sq ) be the status quo and let (x sq , y sq ) be the person's choice given the status quo and the budget set. That is, the individual's choice (x t , y t ) in period t can be characterized by the function Cx , y sa = 9, 1) and the status quo allocation under scenario B is 1 pound of candy and 9 liters of wine (that is, x sb , y sb = 1, 9) and the price of one pound of candy is equal to the price of a liter of wine, then under scenario A the person will choose more candy and less wine than if the status quo position were B (for example, x sa , y sa = 7, 3 and x sb , y sb = 4, 6). This can be seen as a generalization of the Knetsch example, where the subject was either allocated 0 cups and 1 candy bar or 1 cup and 0 candy bars, the budget set was the line through these two points, and the choice was discrete.
8 DEFINITION 2. An ever-increasing demand or addiction means that x t+1 > x t and y t < y t+1 for every time period t after a one-time counter-clockwise rotation in the budget set.
We will now show that when there is status-quo bias, a one-time decrease in the price of x, will result in an ever-increasing demand for x.
PROPOSITION. Given the above assumptions, if there is status quo bias, then a one-time rotation in the budget set around the status quo that results in the relative decrease in the price of x will result in an ever-increasing demand for x. Note that b t = b 1 for all t ≥ 1.
In period t, the status quo point is the consumption profile in period t-1. Thus in period 2, the consumption profile x 1 , y 1 will be seen as the status quo. Therefore, in period 2 the individual will choose x 2 , y 2 = Cx 2 y 2 ( b 1 ) = Cx 1 y 1 (b 1 ). Because x 2 = x 1 > x 0 = x 1 and y 2 = y 1 < y 0 = y 1 , status-quo bias will result in x 2 > x 1 and y 2 < y 1 . In period 3, x 2 , y 2 will be seen as the status quo, and the whole process will start over again. The chosen allocation will continue to shift towards greater x and less y. Hence, status-quo bias can be seen as implying addiction, where the individual buys more and more of the item. Alternatively, the status quo could be viewed as a weighted sum of the present status quo and the previous status quo. Clearly this does not change the analysis; it just makes each move smaller.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Asset bubbles and collecting stamps might be characterized as a type of addiction, but it is unlikely that consumer behavior is in general addictive. If one day the relative price of peas decreases, it is unlikely that you will start on a never-ending spiral of eating more and more peas.
So one might question the validity of one or both of the behavioralist assumptions employed in this paper. In this case, downward sloping demand seem more universally true than status-quo bias, but perhaps that is just the status-quo bias of a neoclassical economist. Still there is some experimental evidence arguing against status-quo bias. Plott and Zeiler suggest that most (but not all) of the observed status-quo bias may be an artifact of previous research methodology. From a more theoretical perspective, Mandler (2004) claims that people don't want to make choices right away when they are put into a new situation because they don't have a complete ordering.
Hence what appears to be status-quo bias may just be cautionary behavior. Status quo bias may be ephemeral rather than persistent.
In the end it is important to emphasize that the argument here is not against the behavioralist enterprise in general, but rather against one particular well-cited result -status-quo bias. There may well be other behavioral relationships that are contradictory of both standard neo-classical economics and status-quo bias. For example, Koszegi and Rabin (Forthcoming) have a model that is based on expectations rather than on the status quo. But whatever the set of behavioral observations or assumptions, one should undertake the kind of exercise undertaken in this paper and determine whether the set of behavioral observations imply behavior that is consistent with the real world.
